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The Fight for Pay: How the Supreme Court Ultimately May Use 




College athletics have always been, and likely will always continue to be, 
an incredibly unique American phenomenon.1 At the head of this 
phenomenon is the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), 
which oversees nearly half a million student-athletes who compete across 
twenty-four sports every year.2 Under the current NCAA rules, colleges 
may only pay for athletes’ legitimate educational expenses, and any athletes 
who are paid to play become ineligible.3 While these student-athletes have 
long been considered amateurs, debates over whether college athletes 
should be paid have increased in recent years.4 This was further intensified 
in September of 2019, when California Governor Gavin Newsom signed the 
Fair Play to Play Act into law.5 This Act, which becomes law in the 
beginning of 2023, will result in college athletes being allowed to financially 
benefit from their name, image, and likeness to promote products and 
companies for the first time ever.6   
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Soon, the Supreme Court could issue an opinion in NCAA v. Alston that 
would end this debate altogether by possibly allowing college athletes to be 
compensated for non-educational purposes. To fully understand the 
buildup to Alston, one must first look back to NCAA v. Board of Regents of 
the University of Oklahoma, where the Supreme Court found that the 
NCAA’s television plan violated antitrust law.7 In making its decision, the 
Court held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes 
are subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of 
antitrust cases.8 As a result of this lower standard, the NCAA has always 
argued that antitrust law allows them to restrict athlete compensation to 
promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from 
professional sports.9  
 
Beginning in 2014, several Division 1 athletes sued the NCAA arguing that 
the restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits” violates antitrust 
law under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.10 This led to a class action suit, 
where the student-athletes argued that the NCAA’s restrictions violate 
antitrust law by preventing athletes from receiving fair-market 
compensation for their labor.11 The district court ruled in favor of the 
athletes, saying that the NCAA must allow some academic benefits such as 
“computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible 
items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless 
related to the pursuit of academic studies.”12 However, this apparent 
victory was quite limited in scope, as the court held that the NCAA could 
still limit cash or cash-equivalent awards for academic purposes.13 The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, concluding that the NCAA’s practices 
violated antitrust law,14 and in December of 2020, the Supreme Court 
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granted certiorari to ultimately decide whether the NCAA’s prohibition on 
compensating college athletes is a violation of federal antitrust law.15 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States.”16 The Supreme Court interpreted Section 1 as 
outlawing “only unreasonable restraints.”17 Most often, restraints are 
analyzed under the “rule of reason,”18 which is a three step analysis that 
attempts “to distinguish between restraints with anticompetitive effect[s] 
that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition 
that are in the consumer’s best interest.”19 The NCAA believes its eligibility 
restrictions should be subject to a less stringent review because they are not 
really a commercial venture, and instead are an association to make 
collegiate sports possible as part of a greater educational mission of the 
university.20  
 
Even under the stricter “rule of reason” antitrust analysis, the NCAA 
believes they should prevail, arguing that the Ninth Circuit used the wrong 
definition of amateur when affirming the case.21 Pointing to the Court’s 
decision in Board of Regents where they said the conception of amateurism 
is that student-athletes “must not be paid,”22 the NCAA’s argument focuses 
on how their restrictions are positive, and “are so clearly procompetitive 
that their lawfulness under the antitrust laws can and should be determined 
early in litigation” under any standard of review.23 
 
The student-athletes in Alston argue that the NCAA’s restrictions to protect 
amateurism do not create enough benefits for competition to offset the 
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harms they create.24 There is also plenty of skepticism regarding how 
“amateur” NCAA athletics really are, considering college sports bring in 
over $1 billion in revenue each year.25 They argue that what the NCAA is 
essentially requesting from the Court is an “outright exemption” from 
federal antitrust law.26 The athletes further argue that issuing such an 
exemption is inappropriate for the courts, and instead is more aptly suited 
for Congress to decide.27  
 
Supporting briefs have been filed in favor of both sides from a variety of 
groups.28 One such brief filed by a group of states in favor of the NCAA, 
cautioned that if the lower court’s ruling is allowed to stand, colleges will 
be in a lose-lose situation by creating tremendous pressure to dramatically 
increase their athletic spending.29 The result would be, they argue, that 
schools would be forced to either reallocate money from other areas such 
as educational programs or non-revenue sports, or not increase athletic 
spending at the price of no longer being competitive with other universities’ 
programs.30 Several briefs have been filed on behalf of the student-athletes, 
including from the Biden administration,31 historians,32 and a group of 
former NCAA officials.33 Whether arguing that these athletes should not be 
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support of the NCAA, while fourteen briefs were filed in support of the student-athletes).  
29 Brief for Georgia et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, NCAA v. Alston, 
petition for cert. filed, No. 20-512 & 20-520 (U.S. Oct. 2020). 
30 Id. 
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considered amateur or that the NCAA is clearly profiting off their athletes 
who are not paid, these briefs all push for the Court to affirm the Ninth 
Circuit and hold that the NCAA’s restrictions on “non-cash education-
related benefits” violates antitrust law under the Sherman Act.  
 
The Supreme Court heard the oral argument for Alston on March 31, 2021, 
and while a decision may not come about until sometime this summer, 
justices on both sides of the political spectrum were quite skeptical of the 
NCAA’s defense regarding amateurism.34 When the NCAA relied on the 
historical success of their approach, Justice Kagan said “I guess it doesn’t 
move me all that much that there’s a history to this if what is going on now 
is that competitors, as to labor, are combining to fix prices.”35 This concern 
was shared by Justice Kavanaugh, who believed that it seems like “the 
schools are conspiring with competitors, agreeing with competitors . . . to 
pay no salaries to the workers who are making the schools billions of dollars 
on the theory that consumers want the schools to pay their workers 
nothing.”36  Kavanaugh continued, “[a]nd that just seems entirely circular 
and even somewhat disturbing.”37 Several of the Justices used variations of 
“exploitation” in describing how the student-athletes are being treated.38 
However, despite the heavy skepticism, there seemed to be some hesitation 
to make any sort of sweeping changes. Justice Breyer discussed how the 
case was tough for him “because it's a unique product and it brings joy to a 
lot of people,” and that he worries “about judges getting into the business 
of deciding how amateur sports should be run.”39 
 
 
“the NCAA’s professed commitment to ‘amateurism’ has become a way of preserving 
the market that the NCAA has come to dominate, rather than a means of protecting and 
benefitting college athletes.” They further point out that despite a massive expansion in 
revenue raised by major sports, the percentage of revenue actually devoted to financial 
aid has decreased.)  
34 Dan Wetzel, NCAA v. Alston: Supreme Court Not Impressed with Old Arguments, But How 
Will it Rule?, YAHOO SPORTS (Mar. 31, 2021), https://sports.yahoo.com/nca-as-stubborn-
apathetic-nature-on-display-in-front-of-supreme-court-195237939.html.  
35 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, NCAA v. Alston (Mar. 31, 2021) (No. 20-512, 20-
520). 
36 Id. at 33. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 17, 34. 
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In the end, it can be extremely difficult to try to predict the outcome of any 
Supreme Court case based on how the oral arguments went, and that is no 
less true here. Based on the tone and flow of the arguments though, neither 
side seemed to have a clear five votes in their favor. However, there does 
seem to be a willingness by the Court to at least rule in favor of some 
incremental changes that benefit student-athletes. While the athletes hope 
for the Court to completely flip the script on the NCAA and find that their 
restrictions violate antitrust law, the NCAA hopes the Court will overturn 
the Ninth Circuit and fend off proponents of paying student-athletes for a 
little bit longer. Whatever the outcome may be, as more states and student 
athletes push for compensation, the NCAA’s weak “amateurism” 
argument appears to be more exposed every time it is used. Could Alston 
be the case to finally defeat the NCAA’s classic argument and change the 
game forever? Possibly, if the Supreme Court affirms this decision. But even 
if the Court overturns the case and rules in favor of the NCAA, it is clear 
that this fight would be far from over. 
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